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Revolution, Culture and Collective Action 
GREGORY F. ROSE 
The University of Texas at Austin 
It is possible to argue, as Theda Skocpol did in her retrospective 
analysis of the Iranian revolution, that the Islamic revolution in Iran 
represents a fundamentally new type of revolution, a type which, precisely 
because of its novel introduction of "the possible role of idea systems and 
cultural understandings in the shaping of political action,'' 1 escapes 
hitherto-developed analytical categories. Such a view, however, is 
misleading. It is misleading precisely because the novelty in the Iranian case 
is not typological. 
The novelty in the Iranian case is the degree to which this revolution 
highlights the relationship between culture and collective action. The Ira-
nian case merely exhibits in a more striking and unmistakeable fashion a 
dynamic which is common to all revolutions, but which structural analysis 
of the causes of revolution obscures because of assumptions such analysts 
tend to make concerning a particular kind of collective action - revolu-
tionary mobilization. Specifically, structural analysis of the causes of 
revolutions assumes that economic outcomes associated with structural 
causes are the necessary and, usually, sufficient conditions for revolu-
tionary mobilization. In the Iranian case strictly economic incentives, while 
present, were clearly of tertiary importance. 2 The fact that economic out-
comes were not generally the source of revolutionary mobilization in Iran 
does not suggest that Iran's revolution is a new type; rather it suggests that 
the problem of revolutionary mobilization is a serious collective action 
problem and that the econornic-determinist assumptions carried in struc-
tural analyses simply ignore the collective action problem by postulation of 
strictly economic incentives for revolutionary mobilization. 
What the case of Iran does provide is additional insight into the ways in 
which collective action problems can be addressed. It raises the question of 
whether culture - broadly defined - can condition an environment in 
which the problem of revolutionary mobilization as collective action can be 
rendered less intractable. The problem, to be sure, with culture as a variable 
is that culture, by definition varies little over long periods of time. In the 
case of Iran, however, one can see the impact of the cultural variable by 
observing the relationship between changes of residency patterns of certain 
"culture-bearers" and their amenability to revolutionary mobilization. 
The general framework used for this analysis is that developed by 
Samuel Popkin in his study of the Vietnamese revolution. 3 Popkin argues 
that shifting the focus of analysis from aggregates to individuals permits 
greater insight into the ways in which revolutionary movements mobilize a 
mass base for seizing state power. Key to this shift of analysis is considera-
tion of the problem posed by Mancur Olson in his general study of collec-
tive action, the problem of the free rider. Two assumptions characterize ac-· 
tors where the free rider problem emerges - rationality (the actor discerns 
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open alternatives and is capable of rank-ordering alternative courses of ac-
tion in terms of maximizing some preferred utility) and egoism (the actor 
most prefers that utility which most realizes his self-interest).' Two assump-
tions also characterize collective goods susceptible to the free rider problem 
- the impossibility of excluding noncontributors and the jointness of the 
goods' supply. In b,rief, the rational actor will choose that course of action 
which imposes no costs upon himself if the collective action of others pro-
duces a good from which he cannot be excluded, regardless of his noncon-
tribution - the problem which Olson identifies becomes the fact that: 
... unless there is coercion or some other special device 
to make individuals act in their common interest, ra-
tional, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve 
their common or group interest.' 
Olson suggests that the use of such special devices which produce excludable 
goods for individuals can induce willingness on the part of rational-egoist 
actors to engage in collective action . This view is termed the "by-product" 
theory of collective goods. Popkin expands on Olson's original analysis by 
suggesting that: 
Contributions can occur (1) because persons contribute 
for reasons of ethics, conscience, or altruism; 
(2) because it pays to contribute on a pure cost-benefit 
basis; (3) because of selective incentives (excludable 
benefits), which can be either positive or negative; or 
(4) because it pays to contribute, given that the con-
tributions of others are contingent on one's own con-
tribution. 6 
In analyzing the Vietnamese revolution, Popkin suggests that peasants, 
as rational-egoist actors, evaluate risks of participation in revolutionary 
movements in terms of the ability of these movements to provide selective 
incentives, the degree to which the leadership of such movements is credi-
ble, and the degree to which individual p!.!,rticipation is a condition of con-
tribution by others. 
The role of the political entrepreneur, as Popkin terms the revolu-
tionary leadership, is pivotal. The mobilizing success of the political en-
trepreneur is conditioned by the degree to which he communicates in terms 
and symbols which his target audience understands, he presents a credible 
vision of the future, he embodies a persuasive moral code (frequently in-
volving self-abnegation), he is familiar as a figure of authority to the target 
audience, and he can provide "local goods and goods with immediate 
payoffs" to convince the target audience of his efficacy. 1 
In applying Popkin's framework to the Iranian case, I shall concen-
trate on revolutionary events in Tehran in the period August 1978 to 
February 1979.' The vast majority of Tehran's urban poor, concentrated 
primarily in the southern half of the city, consisted of either first- or second-
generation peasant migrants to the city who frequently maintained close 
social and economic links to the peasant communities from which they 
emigrated.' Thus, if Popkin 's analysis of the constraints on peasant 
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behavior imposed by village life is correct, one might expect Iran's recently-
urbanized peasants to exhibit approximations of the behavior Popkin 
predicts. While the anthropological literature on recently-urbanized 
peasants in Iran is sparse, what literature exists suggests striking parallels to 
Popkin's model of peasant behavior; even more striking is the parallel be-
tween anthropological studies of peasant behavior in villages in Iran and 
Popkin's observations in Vietnam. Furthermore, survey-research studies of 
peasant motivations for emigration to urban centers in Iran strongly sug-
gests that threat to subsistence was less a motivation than anticipation of a 
higher standard of living available even to unskilled day-laborers in urban 
centers. 10 Thus, recently-urbanized peasants in Iran exhibited no great risk-
aversion, but precisely the rational risk calculation which Popkin predicts. 
The question which acutely arises is: why did these recently-urbanized 
peasants become mobilized as the vast majority of active participants in the 
revolutionary movement? What special incentives might have induced this 
collective action and, more specifically, what special incentives might have 
induced collective action of the particular type which occurred in Tehran? 
This second question is significant in light of the gross disparity in recently-
urbanized peasant participation in revolutionary demonstrations organized 
by the left and the National Front and those organized by the religious op-
position; a call from the left or the National Front might produce a 
demonstration of fifty thousand to two-hundred and fifty thousand per-
sons; a call from Imam Khomeini put two to four million fnto the streets. 
I suggest that recently-urbanized peasants chose to accept the leader-
ship of Imam Khomeini and the religious opposition because that revolu-
tionary leadership possessed more credible political entrepreneurs and pro-
vided a strong special incentive, the by-product of which was collective 
revolutionary action. 
Analyzing the religious opposition's leadership, and that of Imam 
Khomeini in particular, a compelling case can be made for this proposition. 
Anthropological and political observers have frequently commented on 
Khomeini's use of terms, symbols and a speaking style which com-
municated more effectively with the peasant audience than any other· figure 
in the opposition (Khomeini's radio-broadcast speeches are delivered with a 
strong rural-accent and grammatical constructions which are more common 
to the language of the lower social classes, and the peasant in particular, 
than upper-class "literary" Persian). A content analysis of the speeches of 
Khomeini and other religious opposition leaders in the pre-revolutionary 
period indicates a high correlation between the semantic fields employed by 
these leaders and their recently-urbanized peasant audience. The vision of 
the future presented by Imam Khomeini, portrayed as it was in traditional 
and religious imagery, was more credible than any non-religious, particular-
ly Western, vision, the substance of which was, at best, incomprehensible to 
the recently-urbanized peasant and, at worst, deeply offensive. Similarly, 
Imam Khomeini in particular embodied a demanding moral code, the 
substance of which was shared by the recently-urbanized peasant audience, 
and Imam Khomeini's ascetic image stood in stark contrast to much of the 
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imperial elite and competing revolutionary leaderships (this contention can 
be called into question with respect to other figures in the leadership of the 
religious opposition - however, Imam Khomeini, by and large, symbolized 
the religious leadership for the target audience). Furthermore, the religious 
leadership was, indeed, familiar to the recently-urbanized peasant as a 
source of authority (the seniormost religious leaders, including Imam Kho-
meini, were known as the maraji'-i taqlid- "sources of emulation" - and 
every believer, to the extent that he is not himself an expert in Islamic 
jurisprudence, is obligated in Shi'i Islam to emulate such a source in matters 
of religious practice, an institution known as marja'iyyat). 
The fifth characteristic of effective political entrepreneurship - provi-
sion of local goods and goods with immediate payoffs - is less evident in 
the Iranian case (and this is to an extent a consequence of the fact that the 
Vietnamese case from which Popkin derived his model involved prolonged 
guerrilla warfare, while the Iranian case was of far shorter duration and was 
a largely urban affair). However, it can be plausibly argued that the provi-
sion of social welfare, through sadaqat (charity) and khoms (a kind of unof-
ficial religious tax administered by the maraji'-i taqlicf) distributed by the 
local mosques, after the collapse of the unskilled construction labor market 
in Tehran in 1975-76 constituted such a local good with an immediate 
payoff, particularly in light of the absence of a state-organized welfare 
system. Still, this local good was certainly far less in scope and impact than 
the local goods provided by Vietnamese revolutionaries. 
The special incentive provided by the religious opposition was, simply 
put, salvation. As Popkin himself notes, " . .. the quintessential excludables 
often involve religion." 12 In the case of Shi'i Islam, the strong identification 
of salvific faith with action to embody that faith, suggested by the 
jurisprudential definition of iman (faith) as tasdiq (realization of God's will 
on earth), conditioned salvation on behavior which aimed at realizing God's 
intended polity on earth. 11 This was reinforced, no doubt, by the traditional 
institution of marja'iyyat. Once the attention of the recently-urbanized 
peasant was drawn by the religious leadership to the claimed entailment of 
revolutionary action by the basic tenets of the faith, revolutionary mobiliza-
tion rapidly occurred. 
To be sure, Imam Khomeini had made such a call in 1963 and, while 
the imperial regime was sorely tested by the ensuing clashes, no successful 
revolutionary mobilization took place. I suggest that the difference in 
1978-79 was in the concentration of the target audience in urban centers 
which took place in the period 1964-1978 and which permitted considerably 
more effective communication between the leadership of the religious op-
position and the target audience. Table I shows the distribution of popula-
tion in Iran's ten largest cities in 1966 and 1976. Tehran's population alone 
increased by nearly 400Jo in that ten year period. 14 Table 2 indicates that 
rural-to-urban migration throughout Iran accounted for 35.2% of the ur-
ban population increase in the same period, with an average annual increase 
of 211,000 during the period attributed to rural-to-urban migration. A pea-
sant population, thus, was concentrated from the relative diffused environ-
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ment of Iran's 60,000 villages to a few urban centers, of which the most pro-
minent was Tehran . In these centers, these urbanized peasants increasingly 
turned to their cultural tradition, in particular Shi'i Islam, in response to the 
anomie they experienced in the urban environment.'' This concentration in 
urban centers of a population culturally-conditioned to religious appeals, 
coupled with the increasing stature of Imam Khomeini as a religious leader 
(Popkin's fourth criterion of political entrepreneurship) as he became 
almost exclusively identified as the source of religious opposition to the im-
perial regime, provided the key difference between 1963 and 1978-79. 
Application of Popkin's framework to the Iranian case highlights, 
then the interesting way in which the Iranian revolution resolved the collec-
tive ;ction problem presented to it and sets the basis for a rather more in-
teresting theoretical point. 
Ci ly 
Tehran 
Isfahan 
Mashhad 
Tabriz 
hiraz 
Ahvaz 
Abadan 
Kcrmanshah 
Qom 
Rash, 
TABLE I 
Population Distribution in Iran's Ten Largest Cities: 
1966-1976 
1966 
2,719,730 
424,045 
409,616 
403,413 
269,865 
206,375 
272,962 
187,930 
134,292 
143,557 
Sour« : Adapted from Kazemi, Po,.·erty and Revoluflon ,n Iran, p. 17. 
TABLE 2 
lncru e In Iranian Urban Populallon: 1966-76 
Natural Population 
Increase 
Rural to Urban 
M1gra1ion 
Total 
Populallon 
(000 ) 
2,621 
2,111 
Source: Adapted from Kucmi, Poverty and Revotunon ,n Iran, p 14. 
Percent or 
Total 
lncrtase 
43.7 
35.2 
1976 
4,496,159 
671,825 
670, 180 
598,516 
416,408 
329,006 
296,0 I 
290,861 
246,831 
187,203 
Avtrage Annual 
Increase 
(000) 
262 
211 
Similar to the "free rider" problem of collective action is the problem 
of the "Prisoners' Dilemma." Here it is shown that under certain condi-
tions rational-egoist actors will be unable to reach a Pareto-optimal solution 
to their dilemma, despite the convergence of their interests. The following 
matrix illustrates the problem (where R is the reward, P is the punishment, 
T is the utility accruing to defection, and S is the "sucker" payoff): 
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B's Choice 
Payoff Ordering: 
COOPE RATE 
DEFECT 
T>R>P>S 
Prisoner A's Choice: 
COOPERATE DEFECT 
R,R (3,3) S,T (1,4) 
T,S (4,1) P ,P (2.2) 
Condition: R > (S + T)/ 2 
In this game, both prisoners would be worse off by defecting than by 
cooperating, but each ranks the utility accruing to defection higher in his 
own self-interest than the utility of cooperation. When one adds, however, 
certain additional assumptions, this outcome is no longer so clear. For ex-
ample, if one assumes that both prisoners are members of Casa Nostro, 
sworn to the oath of silence - omerta - and aware that defection would 
likely result in the defector's murder at the hands of other organization 
members, the subjective game matrix for the prisoners would be: 
Prisoner B: COOPE RATE 
DEFECT 
Prisoner A: 
COO PERATE 
R,R (4,4) 
T,S (2,3) 
DEFECT 
S,T (3,2) 
P,P (l,l ) 
Thus, introduction of an assumption about prior relations of power, expec-
tation, values and conventions can radically change the expected outcome 
by predisposing the players to cooperation. Such outcomes have been 
generally noted with respect to repeated-iteration games. As Alexander 
Field suggests, rational-choice analysis has precisely to make assumptions 
about such factors which affect how interests are determined and, conse-
quently, how calculations about interests are made. 16 
This excursus into the "Prisoners' Dilemma" highlights the general 
theoretical contribution of the Iranian case. If the problem of revolutionary 
mobilization is a free rider problem, then the intractability of such a free 
rider problem is conditioned by the ways in which prior factors affect deter-
mination of interests by actors and the ways in which actors make calcula-
tions about their interests. This complex of prior factors is the "web of 
significance" which Clifford Geertz has defined as "culture:" "a context, 
something within which [social events] can be intelligibly described ."' 7 At 
least four of Popkin's criteria of effective political entrepreneurship (com-
municative skill, shared vision, persuasive moral codes, and familiarity of 
authority) point to the effect of culture on overcoming the problem of col-
lective action. Furthermore, it is reasonable to suppose that cultures 
wherein which special incentives are plentiful or a certain special incentive is 
especially prized or a particular culture-bearing population is especially 
available to political entrepreneurs provide environments wherein the prob-
lem of collective action can be more easily surmounted. This certainly seems 
to be the case for Iran. 
This analysis brings us full circle to the observation that structural 
analyses of the causes of revolution fail to explain the Iranian case because 
of their economic -determinist assumptions about collective action. The Ira-
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nian case, certainly, does not suggest that extra-economic phenomena lie at 
the root of all revolutionary mobilization; rather, it underscores the impor-
tance of the problem of collective action and, while economic special incen-
tives may be present in some cases, the cultural environment can, and in the 
case of Iran does, provide equally compelling special incentives. The ques-
tion becomes, then, an empirical one. 
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